The Jewish Origins of Israeli Foreign Policy: A Study in Tradition and Survival by Shmuel Sandler

Author:Shmuel Sandler [Sandler, Shmuel]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: International Relations, Middle Eastern, Social Science, Political Science, World, Regional Studies, General
ISBN: 9781351762717
Google: cmymDwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 34703287
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2017-09-18T10:27:33+00:00

Retaliation policy

Most of the acts of insurgency that took place during these years were not initiated by the hosting governments, but were carried out by local insurgents aiming at theft from Jewish settlements close to the borders. Israel’s reactions were designed to force the Egyptian and Jordanian governments to take action against infiltration from their territory (Milstein 1972, 139–166). Yet while a pattern of action and reaction developed, the retaliation policy also had a strategic goal: that of reducing the pressure for another war (Aronson and Horowitz 1971, 77–99).

This strategy was not shared by all Israeli policy makers. Two schools developed in decision-making circles. Ben-Gurion and the IDF Chief of Staff, Moshe Dayan, headed the “activist” school as it came to be known, argued that only effective retribution would convince the Arabs to stop acts of insurgency against Israel. Failure to act would convince the Arabs that the state was weak and could be swallowed up and that Israel could be wiped off the map. The other school was headed by Moshe Sharett, Israel’s first foreign minister, who contended that Israel’s policy of retaliation should always take into consideration whether an act of violence would advance the cause of peace. Ultimately, he maintained, peace is the only guarantee for Israel’s survival (Morris 2003, 265).

In the analysis articulated by Sharett, he did not accuse the other school of militarism. He presented the debate as a legitimate one between two approaches disagreeing on what would best safeguard of the state – violent retaliation or diplomatic action.6 And yet, during Sharett’s term as prime minister when Ben- Gurion resigned and moved to the Negev, and while advancing diplomatic campaigns in response to terror acts from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, the IDF executed also several violent responses. Ultimately, neither the diplomatic approach nor the violent retaliations achieved deterrence. The situation in the region deteriorated to a war – the Suez Campaign, also known as “Operation Kadesh,” in 1956.

The second soft spot as presented in Yigal Alon’s analysis of Israel’s geo- strategic doctrine was the threat from Syria in the northeast of the country. In addition to the topographic advantage of the Golan Heights, Syria also controlled the easterly water sources of the Sea of Galilee. The Syrian threat was exacerbated with Israel’s activation of the National Water Carrier in June 1964 that transported water from the Sea of Galilee, south to the rest of the country. Supported formally by the Arab League, Damascus began diverting the Syrian sources of the Jordan River thus reducing the volume of water flowing into the Sea of Galilee. In a series of military incidents during March–April 1965, Israel destroyed the Syrian equipment. In July 1966, Israel even activated its air force which destroyed equipment positioned at some distance from the sea (Wallach and Lissak 1978, 25). Nevertheless, Syria continued to control the Golan Heights from which it could make life in northern Israel extremely difficult. The combination of the two threats – water and topographic supremacy – gave Syria an important strategic leverage over Israel.

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